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The Argentine  crisis witnessed,  among other things,  a  light of the impending risks. This boom was generalized
deposit run, the suspension of deposit convertibility,  and  to all stocks and more pronounced in liquid stocks.
a "boom"  in the stock market. The authors argue that  Furthermore,  the boom was a symptom that deposits
this boom reflects  the cost that depositors were willing to  were  effectively  restricted  and that investors were not
incur to get their money out of the banking system, in  able to circumvent  capital controls.
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grateful  to  Sebastian  Auguste,  Mike  Dooley,  Mike  Melvin,  and Luis  Serven  for  helpful  comments.During  2001,  Argentina  faced  a  currency run  that  triggered  a  generalized  bank
run.'  As a result, Argentina  suspended  convertibility of their bank deposits on December
3 (the so-called  "corralito"),7  and imposed  extensive capital  controls,  measures  that were
followed  on  January  7  by  the devaluation  of the peso  and a compulsory  "pesification"
and reprogramming of most bank deposits on February 3. Following the establishment of
the corralito, the stock market witnessed  a "boom" in prices, in contrast with other recent
crises, resulting in a cumulative increase  of the local stock exchange  index of 64 percent
between  the start of the corralito and the devaluation,  and a further increase of 50 percent
by  end-2002.  Two recent papers  by Auguste  et  al.  (2003)  and Melvin  (2002)  attribute
this seemingly unexpected development to a boom in stocks of companies  with American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) that may have been used as a channel  for capital outflows.
In this note, we complement  this new literature  by showing that the price increase
was  generalized  to  all  stocks,  including  stocks  with  and  without  ADRs,  and  more
pronounced  in  liquid stocks.  We also argue that this mechanism did not generate capital
outflows.  Indeed,  while  ADR stocks  did  provide a way to migrate  equity and  obtain in
exchange  dollars  outside  Argentina,  at  most only  a small  fraction  of these stocks  were
transferred  abroad.  Instead, the  boom reflected  the price investors  were willing to pay to
cash  out  their  inconvertible  bank  deposits,  in  light  of  the  impending  devaluation,
reprogramming,  and  confiscation  risks.  As  a result,  the boom could be interpreted  as  a
consequence  of the effectiveness  of both the suspension  of deposit convertibility  and the
capital controls.
1 See, for example,  De la Torre et al. (2003) and references therein for an analysis of the crisis.
2  The  name  corralito  ("little  fence")  was  initially  adopted  because  deposits  couid  be  transferred  freely
within the financial  system but could not be redeemed in cash and leave the system,  beyond a certain limit.
1R. The coirralto and the stcsk nmnirket l$rDm
As shown in Figure  1, the corralito was preceded by a steady decline  in reserves
and  deposits  during  2001.  The  cumulative  slide  in  reserves  from January  2001  until
November  2001  amounted  to  a loss  of 10.9 billion  dollars, paralleled by a loss of 11.5
billion  dollars  in  deposits.  The  run  peaked  (possibly  in  anticipation  of  the  coming
controls)  on November  30, when deposits  and reserves fell by  1.4 and  1.7  billion dollars
respectively.  The  imposition of the  corralito,  coupled  with a ban on capital  outflows,
significantly halted the decline in both deposits  and reserves. 3
If by November,  the  abandonment  of the fixed  parity  was judged  highly  likely,
the  corralito  signaled  the  practical  demise  of convertibility  and  the  question  was  no
longer  whether  a  devaluation  was  inevitable,  but  rather  what  the  post-devaluation
exchange  rate would be.  Moreover,  the perception  that the corralito had all but reduced
the  incentives  to  run  fueled  beliefs  that  deposits  would  need  to  be  (at  least  partially)
reprogrammed  to  avoid a banking  collapse  or hyperinflation,  in the event  the corralito
was  lifted.  Finally, the option  to pesify deposits and loans, already under discussion  in
policy  circles,  appeared  ever  more  likely,  as  a  way  to  avoid  generalized  defaults.
Consequently,  the  dollarization  of  deposits  was  no  longer  a  realistic  hedge  against
exchange rate risk.4
There  were  at least three powerf'ul  reasons  to  leave the corralito:  i) the  reduced
liquidity of bank deposits  due to limited  convertibility  (only within  the banking sector)
3While there were  no restrictions on the purchase of dollar bills,  right after the imposition of the corralito
the supply of dollars was  increasingly  rationed until December 21,  when the foreign exchange market was
officially closed.
4  All of these beliefs eventually  materialized.  Most time  and savings deposits (including  those matured in
December and shifted to sight accounts)  were reprogrammed  at a longer duration and dollar deposits were
converted at the official (below market)  1.40 peso-dollar exchange rate.
2that generated a "cash premium"; 5 ii) the possible reprogramming of deposits; and iii) the
impending devaluation in combination with  a threat of pesification.
These  reasons  generated  an  increase  in  stock  prices  relative  to  inconvertible
corralito  deposits.  Stocks  prices  (with and  without  ADRs)  were  affected  by  all  three
factors:  stock  prices  were  quoted  in  illiquid  "corralito  pesos,"6 stocks  were
reprogramming-free,  and  stocks  protected  investors  from  a devaluation  (as part of their
returns were tied to dollar revenues);
This  is confirmed  by the evolution of market capitalization-weighted  portfolios of
ADRs  and  non-ADR  stocks  (Figure  2).7  A  closer  look  reveals  that  the post-corralito
boom  was  more  pronounced  in  liquid  stocks:  the  top  five  most  liquid  stocks  in  the
portfolio  (as  determined  by  their  average  value  traded  in  the  period  August  2001  -
September  2001)  experienced  a  substantially  larger  price  hike.'  As  a  result,  once  we
restrict  attention  to  the  most  liquid  stocks,  the  evolution  of both  portfolios  after  the
imposition of the corralito exhibits a similar pattern.9
5  This premium  was  regularly  measured  as the discount  rate  on  checks,  which  declined  gradually  as  the
funds waiting to get out of the corralito  fell over the  year.  By the time the corralito  was lifted on December
2, 2002, the discount was about 2 percent.  Unfortunately,  data on this  premium is only available  starting in
February  2002.
6 An investor holding  cash and willing to invest in stocks could have, for example,  purchased a deposit at a
discount and use it to buy the stock.  Alternatively,  he could have bought the stocks cash, but at a discount.
7The results are not affected by the use of alternative weighting schemes.
8  We use  value traded  in  August  and  September as  the December  and  January  values are  affected  by the
boom in prices.  The results  are robust to the use of different months to compute the weights.
9 As the top five ADR stocks are more liquid  than the top five non-ADR stocks,  one would naturally expect
that the  price boost  would be  larger in  the former,  which was not the case.  This  seemingly  contradicting
result can be explained  by the fact that the price of ADR stocks  in Buenos Aires is also  a function  of the
price of the ADR in New York, which remained  relatively  stable.
32A1R,  cnpitRl contirois,  Snd caphta  otlows
As argued  in previous papers,  ADR stocks  gave investors the option to exchange
inconvertible  deposits  for U.S.  dollars  in the international  financial  centers.  However,
did this fund-shifting mechanism provide  a way to circumvent the controls on deposits or
on capital  outflows?  And did investors  actually  use this fund-shifting  alternative  to get
fresh dollars abroad?  We turn to these two questions next.
Even though ADR stocks  allowed investors  to migrate their stocks  to New  York,
this migration did not mean that controls were circumvented.  On the contrary,  in normal
times  this  migration  is  the  counterpart  of  capital  inflows  to  emerging  markets,  as
domestic  stocks  are  exchanged  for  new  funds  invested  in  the  country.'"  While  it  is
unlikely that the capital  obtained through migration was repatriated  during the crisis, it is
still  true that these  transactions  did not entail  a decline  in the  overall  level  of deposits
(which  would  have  been  otherwise  reflected  in  a  loss  of  deposits  and  reserves).
Depositors  that purchased  stocks  with inconvertible  deposits  simply transferred  them to
previous stocks holders.
The absence of capital outflows can be observed  in the data, both in quantities and
prices.  As  Figure 1 shows,  after dropping significantly  in the pre-crisis period,  reserves
remained  stable  once  the  corralito  and  other  controls  were  imposed.  The  drop  in
deposits,  reflecting  the cash withdrawal  within the limits of the corralito,  translated into
an increase in currency  in circulation.
The effectiveness  o,  capital  controls  is also  apparent in  the ADR  premium  (the
difference  between prices of ADR  stocks  in Buenos Aires  and ADRs in New York).  As
10 Investors  willing to invest in those countries  demand their stocks in international  equity markets, among
other  things.  See  Claessens  et  al.  (2002),  Levine  and  Schmukler  (2003),  and the  long  literature  cited
therein.
4shown in Alaganar  and Bhar (2001), under perfect integration the law of one price holds
as  any  price  difference  is  instantaneously  arbitraged  away.  By  contrast,  market
segmentation  induced  by  capital  controls,  providing they  are  binding  (hence, effective),
leads  to the occurrence  of a premium  as full  arbitrage  cannot  take place."  The  case of
Argentina  is  a  good example;  the premium  was  close  to zero  before  the  controls  were
implemented  and  turned positive  thereafter,  gradually  declining  from around  50 percent
to a value of around 7 percent by the end of May (Figure 3).12
As ADR stocks were priced in corralito pesos  while ADRs were priced in dollars
out of the corralito (and out of the country),  the ADR premium reflected  the three factors
previously  described  plus  the  premium  induced  by  controls  on  capital  outflows.'3
Accordingly,  the  evolution  of  the  premium  over  time  can  be  traced  not  only  to  the
realization  of the reprogramining  and  exchange  rate risks,  but also to the  weakening  of
the  cash  premium  (as  the  reprogramming  of deposits  and  the  steady  leakage  of  un-
reprogrammed  deposits  slowly  reduced  the  volume  of  corralito  funds  pushing  for  the
exit) and to the relaxation of other controls be end-2002.
Finally,  note  that,  despite  the absence  of capital  outflows,  investors  could  have
still taken  advantage of ADR stocks to move their funds out of the country through stock
migration.  We argue  that this occurred  only to a limited extent.  Figure 4 shows that the
average  trading  volume  in  ADRs  in New  York  was  high before  the imposition  of the
" The existence  of controls does  not prevent arbitrage across markets;  it just means  that the non-arbitrage
bands  become wider so  a non-zero  discount can  emerge.  Depending  on the type of control,  a positive or
negative premium emerges.  See Levy Yeyati and Schmukler (1999).
12 The premium is  the percentage  difference between the closing dollar price  of the stock in  Buenos Aires
and  the closing price of the corresponding ADR  in New York.  Each  stock in the portfolio  is weighted by
its relative market capitalization.
13  A  crude estimate of the latter is given by the ADR premium of around  15 percent by end-February  (when
the reprogramming  and exchange  rate risks had already realized)  minus a cash premium of about 9 percent
by the same date (as reported by the Central Bank of Argentina).
5corralito,  as  investors  kept  selling  Argentine  stocks  abroad  while  the  crisis  deepened.
With  the  corralito,  by contrast,  the  trading  of ADR  stockls  in  Buenos  Aires  increased
significantly in relative terms,  more than doubling the activity in New York (which also
represents trades among New York investors).  This evidence  indicates  that only part of
the  purchases  of  the  underlying  stock  ended  up  being  transferred  abroad  during  the
period.  Thus, this fund-shifting ADR-specific motive  does not appear to have been a key
driver behind the stock mar.ket boom.  14
In sum,  the evidence  suggests  that the boom reflected  the desire of depositors  to
shift their inconvertible  deposits out of the banking  system,  although not necessarily  out
of the  country.  In  light of this,  the boom  (as well  as  the  sizeable  ADR  premium  that
accompanied it) was a manifestation that the controls imposed were effective.
14  Note that that the conversion  of local  shares into  ADRs  does not need  to  be reflected in  the trading
volume,  as investors can transfer their stocks  from Buenos Aires to New  Yorkc,  increasing  the number  of
outstanding  ADRs  with  no  increase  in  trading.  However,  to  convert their  deposits  into  cash  investors
would have needed to sell those ADRs, which would have added to the volume traded.
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Deposits  include  dollar and peso deposits  held  by the private  sector.  Dollar deposits  are converted  into pesos using the
market exchange rate. The large jump in deposits on January  11, 2002 reflects the combined effect of the devaluation of the
exchange  rate, increasing  the peso value of dollar deposits, and the pesification of dollar deposits at the 1.4 conversion rate.
Reserves  include gold and currency  in  possession of the central  bank.  The increase in reserves on September  10, 2001  is
due to the disbursement of an IMF loan,  which  was deposited  in  the central  bank.  The  one  billion  U.S.  dollar drop  on
January 24, 2002 corresponds  to the payback of the contigent credit line (CCL).
Sources: Bloomberg  and Central Bank of Argentina
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The Boom  in the Stock Market
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The complete  ADR portfolio includes  all publicly listed  ADR stocks  (12  stocks),  except Nortel  which is highly illiquid.
The non-ADR portfolio includes 43 stocks, excluding  stocks that were traded less  than three days in  the first month of the
corralito. The portfolio is market capitalization weighted, with the weight of each stock determnined by its average  relative
market  capitalization  in  the  period  August  2001-September  2001.  Top five  refers  to  the  five  stocks  with  the  highest
average  value  traded  in  the  period  August  2001-September  2001.  The  top  five  ADR  stocks  includes  Banco Frances,
Grupo  Financiero  Galicia,  Perez  Companc,  Siderca,  and Telecom  Argentina.  The  top  five  non-ADR  stocks  includes
Acindar, Ledesma,  Minetti  Juan, Molinos,  and  Siderar. All stock prices  are taken in pesos. Each  index is equal to  100 on
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The  graph  plots  the  ADR premium  for the  portfolio  of ADRs  (12 stocks).  The premium  is the  percentage  difference
between the closing dollar price of the stock in Buenos Aires and the closing price of the corresponding ADR in New York.
The portfolio is market capitalization  weighted,  with the weight of each stock determined  by its average relative  market
capitalization  in the period August 2001-September 2001.  Note that during the sample period there were days when one of
the  stock  markets  was  closed.  On those  days,  the premium  from the  last  trading  day  is  repeated.  The  peak  premiwum




Trading in Buenos  Aires and New York
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The  figure shows the trading volume of the complete  ADR portfolio  (12  stocks), using the  stocks with ADRs for Buenos
Aires trading and the corresponding ADRs for New York trading. The portfolio is market capitalization  weighted, with the
weight of each stock determiined  by its average  relative  market capitalization  in the period August  2001-September 2001.
Onk days of no trading the trading volume of the previous trading day is repeated.
Source: BloombergPolicy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS3116  Dollarization of the Banking  System:  Gianni De Nicol6  August 2003  A. Yaptenco
Good or Bad?  Patrick Honohan  38526
Alain Ize
WPS3117  Policy Research on Migration and  David Ellerman  August 2003  B. Mekuria
Development  82756
WPS3118  To Share or Not to Share:  Does Local  Beata Smarzynska  August 2003  P.  Flewitt
Participation Matter for Spillovers from  Javorcik  32724
Foreign  Direct Investment?  Mariana  Spatareanu
WPS3119  Evaluating the Impact of Conditional  Laura B. Rawlings  August 2003  M. Colchao
Cash Transfer Programs:  Lessons  Gloria M.  Rubio  38048
from  Latin America
WPS3120  Land Rights and Economic  Quy-Toan  Do  August 2003  P. Sader
Development:  Evidence from Vietnam  Lakshmi Iyer  33902
WPS3121  Do Bilateral Investment Treaties  Mary Hallward-Driemeier  August 2003  A. Bonfield
Attract Foreign  Direct Investment?  31248
Only a Bit ... and They Could Bite
WPS3122  Individual Attitudes Toward  Roberta Gatti  August 2003  N.  Obias
Corruption:  Do Social  Effects Matter?  Stefano  Paternostro  31986
Jamele Rigolini
WPS3123  Production  and Cost Functions  and  Beatriz Tovar  August 2003  G. Chenet-Smith
Their Application to the Port Sector:  Sergio Jara-Diaz  36370
A Literature Survey  Lourdes Trujillo
WPS3124  The Impact of Structural  Reforms on  Neil McCulloch  August 2003  M.  Faltas
Poverty: A Simple Methodology  with  82323
Extensions
WPS3125  Economic Analysis of Health Care  Vicente B. Paqueo  August 2003  R.  Guzman
Utilization and Perceived  Illness:  Christian Y. Gonzalez  32993
Ethnicity and Other Factors
WPS3126  Public Disclosure of Environmental  Jong  Ho Hong  August 2003  Y. D'Souza
Violations in the Republic of Korea  Benoit  Laplante  31449
Craig  Meisner
WPS3127  Small and Medium  Enterprises  Meghana  Ayyagari  August 2003  A. Yaptenco
Across the Globe: A  New Database  Thorsten Beck  31823
Asli Demirgui,-Kunt
WPS3128  Child  Growth,  Shocks, and Food Aid  Takashi Yamano  August 2003  H. Sladovich
in Rural Ethiopia  Harold Alderman  37698
Luc Christiaensen
WPS3129  Price Caps,  Efficiency Payoffs,  and  Antonio Estache  August 2003  A. Estache
Infrastructure Contract Renegotiation  Jose-Luis Guasch  81442
in Latin America  Lourdes Trujillo
WPS3130  The Role of Advocacy in Competition  Tomas  Serebrisky  September 2003  G. Chenet-Smith
Policy: The  Case of the Argentine  36370
Gasoline MarketPolicy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS3131  Social Sector Expenditures and  Christian Y. Gonzalez  September 2003  P. Holt
Rainy-Day Funds  Vicente B. Paqueo  37707
WPS3132  Regional Integration and Technology  Maurice Schiff  September 2003  P. Flewitt
Diffusion:  The Case of the North  Yanling Wang  32724
America Free Trade Agreement
WPS3133  Emerging  Trends in WTO  Dispute  Peter Holmes  September 2003  P. Flewitt
Settlement:  Back to the GATT?  Jim Rollo  32724
Alasdair R.  Young
WPS3134  Institutional Reform and the  Roumeen Islam  September 2003  R.  Islam
Judiciary: Which Way Forward?  32628
WPS3135  Trade  Reforms, Market Access,  Guido G. Porto  September 2003  P. Flewitt
and Poverty in Argentina  32724
WPS3136  Legal Institutions and Financial  Thorsten  Beck  September 2003  A. Yaptenco
Development  Ross Levine  31823
WPS3137  Using  Survey Data to Assess the  Guido G. Porto  September 2003  P. Flewitt
Distributional  Effects of Trade  Policy  32724
WPS3138  Fiscal Federalism and Regional  Rai M.  Desai  September 2003  V. Sapinoso
Growth: Evidence from the Russian  Lev M.  Freinkman  81105
Federation in the 1990s  Itzhak Goldberg
WPS3139  Contracting  Models of the Phillips  Pierre-Richard Agenor  September 2003  M.  Gosiengfiao
Curve:  Empirical Estimates for  Nihal Bayraktar  33363
Middle-Income Countries
WPS3140  Raising the Quality of Secondary  Kaoru  Nabeshima  September 2003  K. Nabeshima
Education in East Asia  37880
WPS3141  Poverty in India during the 1990s:  Yoko Kijima  October 2003  P. Sader
A Regional Perspective  Peter Lanjouw  33902
WPS3142  Credit Reporting  and Financing  Inessa Love  October 2003  A. Yaptenco
Constraints  Nataliya Mylenko  38526
WPS3143  Who Benefits from  Labor Market  Claudio E. Montenegro  October 2003  M.  Arora
Regulations? Chile 1960-1998  Carmen Pages  32955
WPS3144  Market Disequilibria and Inflation in  Thilak Ranaweera  October 2003  P. Raj
Uzbekistan,  1994-2000  33705
WPS3145  Alternative  Paths to Structural  Thilak Ranaweera  October 2003  P. Raj
Adjustment in Uzbekistan in a Three-  33705
Gap Framework